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Kleinman: The Promise of Interrogation v. the Problem of Torture

THE PROMISE OF INTERROGATION V. THE
PROBLEM OF TORTURE
Steven M. Kleinman, Colonel, USAFR∗
I. INTRODUCTION
There is very little glamour attached to the work of
interrogation. The customers are many and often far afield,
which makes it virtually impossible for any head of military
intelligence to appreciate the full value that a Combined
Services Detailed Interrogation Center (CSDIC) can give to
the common effort. A CSDIC transcends the sphere of purely
military intelligence and becomes the handmaiden of all
Departments and Sections, irrespective of service or politics.
It may best be described as a universal agency from which
intelligence can be obtained for the best benefit of the whole
war machine, limited only in its capacity of output by the
number of interrogators and staff available to the
Organization.1
While the act of torture might be reframed as “coercive means” or
“enhanced interrogation techniques,” and may be employed as part of a
government-sanctioned program or only by the so-called “few bad
apples,” the very concept remains an insidious problem that requires an
understanding of its scope and a vision for its resolution. For in a very
real sense, this is a problem that transcends any single frame of
reference. Nonetheless, the many diverse yet interconnected issues that
must be used to form a rational debate on this subject can essentially be
divided into three discrete categories: the legal, the moral, and the
operational (or strategic).

∗
The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, Central
Command, Defense Intelligence Agency, or the U.S. Air Force. Colonel Kleinman
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earned a bachelor of arts in psychology. He subsequently earned a master of science in
forensic sciences and a master of science in strategic intelligence at the National University,
San Diego, California, and the National Defense Intelligence College, Washington, D.C.,
respectively. In addition, he has completed the Air Command and Staff College and the
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1
As quoted in Kent Fedorowich, 14 Axis Prisoners of War as Sources for British Military
Intelligence, 1939-1942, INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 156 (Summer 1999).
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Clearly, the substantive legal issues continue to be aggressively
argued from both sides and need not be treated here in any depth. In a
similar vein, the recent charges of prisoner abuse have already elicited a
reexamination of where the national moral compass lies relative to the
treatment of prisoners. Thus, this Article attempts to primarily address
the operational considerations that have been largely ignored in public
and professional debate, with the realization that operational interests
can never be fully divorced from either the legal or moral elements.
This assertion was dramatically illustrated when the world awoke to
a global media awash with reports and graphic imagery of abuses
occurring during the detention and questioning of suspected terrorists
and insurgents at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib. In response to this
media coverage, interrogation suddenly surfaced as a major topic of both
professional and public debate and has retained its place in the spotlight
ever since. Previously lost in the shadows cast by other intelligence
collection disciplines, this served as the impetus for a long overdue
examination of the role of interrogation as a critical instrument in
fighting the global war on terrorism (“GWOT”) and the
counterinsurgency in Iraq. Unfortunately, this important debate was
quickly co-opted by politics and passion at the expense of expertise and
experience.
Setting forth the premise that interrogation operations are a
necessary capability in modern intelligence collection, this Article seeks
to accomplish two critical tasks. First, it sets forth a brief yet practical
assessment of the state of the art in strategic-level interrogation. This
assessment is done in large measure to remove the enduring shroud of
misconception that continues to undermine a reasoned examination of
the discipline’s role in contemporary warfare. Second, it is not enough to
simply bring the craft back from its submersion into the darkness; rather,
a proactive and prescriptive approach to the way ahead is necessary and
forms the basis for this Article’s second task.
Clearly, strategic interrogation is a collection discipline that has
reached a strategic inflection point in its evolution. As a result, decisionmakers are presented with three distinct choices that will shape the
future of the discipline. First, they can take concrete steps to preclude
future controversy by simply ending U.S. involvement in such a
controversial and potentially problematic activity. Unless a major
investment is undertaken to develop a professional cadre of skilled
operators guided by sound doctrine, this may prove to be the most
prudent course of action.
Second, activity in this sphere can be limited to tactical or combat
interrogation. The interrogation schools operated by the U.S. Army and
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Marine Corps continue to produce interrogators who are highly skilled
in the fundamentals of tactical field interrogations and who are able to
effectively glean intelligence information from low-level sources in a
time-compressed environment. However, the nature of this type of
training and the demographics of the personnel recruited into these
programs have not—and will not—create the type of strategic-level
capability required to systematically exploit the unique intelligence
potential presented by “high-value targets.” In the GWOT and
counterinsurgency effort, the sophistication of the captured personnel
and their knowledge of U.S. intelligence methods cannot be
overestimated.2 Similarly, the complexity of the information sought
through strategic interrogation (i.e., intelligence that will aid in
understanding the adversary’s distinctive centers of gravity) ranges far
afield from the type of concrete military information the disciplined
tactical interrogator demands of the captured enemy infantryman.3
Finally, the defense and intelligence communities can move to
embrace the full potential of strategic interrogation through a major shift
in mission, organization, and training commitments, which would far
exceed the minimal resources and attention offered by the current
paradigm.
II. INTERROGATION: A BRIEF HISTORY
It should not come as a surprise to learn that the interrogation of
prisoners is one of the earliest forms of intelligence collection. Examples
abound, from antiquity to the present, of circumstances where
information derived from interrogations played a key, even critical, role
in the outcome of major battles. In one of the earliest recorded instances
of prisoner interrogation, the ancient Egyptian forces of Pharaoh Ramses
II gathered invaluable information from captured Hittites during the
battle of Kadesh. In this instance, the Hittite king dispatched two
Bedouins, who presented themselves as deserters, to spread
disinformation among the advisors to Ramses II. The operation was
effectively neutralized when Egyptian forces interrogated two additional
Hittite spies, who ultimately confided that the entire Hittite army waited
in ambush beyond the city of Kadesh. This vital information ultimately
spared Ramses II what otherwise would have been an inevitable defeat.4
See generally GEORGE FRIEDMAN, AMERICA’S SECRET WAR: INSIDE THE HIDDEN
WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE BETWEEN AMERICA AND ITS ENEMIES 1–2 (Doubleday 2004).
3
See generally CHRIS MACKEY & GREG MILLER, THE INTERROGATORS: INSIDE THE SECRET
WAR AGAINST AL QAEDA 45 (Little, Brown and Company 2004).
4
Paul Fein, We Have Ways . . . The Law and Morality of the Interrogation of Prisoners
of War 70 (Nov. 30, 1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University) (on file
2
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Interrogation also played a pivotal role in the ongoing expansion of
an empire. During the Second Punic War, Roman troops gained critical
intelligence on planned Carthaginian military formations through the
interrogation of captured military couriers. This intelligence empowered
the Roman commander, Claudius Nero, to launch a preemptive strike
that sealed a decisive victory over the Carthaginian forces, thereby
enabling Rome to continue in its quest for dominance over the western
world.5
Accordingly, a number of history’s leading military strategists have
placed a premium on the value of interrogation to commanders.
Antoine Henri Jomini, the distinguished nineteenth century Swiss
general, detailed the value of interrogation in his seminal book, The Art of
War. Along with a system of espionage and reconnaissance, Jomini
described interrogation as one of the most reliable sources of intelligence
for an enemy.6 Military leaders in the American Civil War shared this
view. The value placed on interrogation was evidenced by the fact that
the “thorough and coordinated” examination of captured prisoners was
often conducted by very senior officers, including such notable figures as
Generals McClellan, Meade, and Sheridan.7
The intelligence potential of a systematic interrogation effort was
also not lost on America’s adversaries in the twentieth century. Dulag
Luft, the Luftwaffe interrogation camp during World War II, proved to
be an irreplaceable source of intelligence on Allied air operations.
History has recorded the exceptional—and colorful—performance of
Hanns Scharff, an interrogator at the camp who deftly obtained highvalue intelligence from Allied aircrews. His accomplishments would be
noteworthy if only for the incredible volume of intelligence he was able
to gather. Equally remarkable, however, were his methods. Rather than
compelling his prisoners to reveal classified data through the use of
coercive means (as some of his colleagues were known to employ in
ruthless fashion), his consistent success was the result of carefully
orchestrated, essentially amicable exchanges with his prisoners.
with the Army Intelligence School Library) (quoting FRANCIS DVORNIK, ORIGINS OF
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES: THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST, PERSIA, GREECE, ROME, BYZANTIUM, THE
ARAB MUSLIM EMPIRES, THE MONGOL EMPIRE, CHINA, MUSCOVY 12, 14 (Rutgers University
Press 1974)).
5
See DAVID KAHN, HITLER’S SPIES: GERMAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN WORLD WAR II
27 (Da Capo Press 1978).
6
See MICHAEL I. HANDEL, MASTERS OF WAR: CLASSICAL STRATEGIC THOUGHT 249 (Frank
Cass 3d ed. 2001) (1992).
7
Fein, supra note 4, at 73 (quoting PETER MASLOWSKI, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
DURING THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: A CASE STUDY, IN U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
HISTORY: A SOURCEBOOK 30, 36 (James P. Finley ed., U.S. Army Intelligence Center and
Fort Hauchuca 1995)).
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Drawing upon his mastery of the complex art of interrogation, he offers
this observation concerning the timeless value of the discipline as a form
of intelligence collection:
AS LONG AS WARS have been waged on this earth,
captors have taken the right to question captives. As
long as POWs are interrogated, they will talk. No
patriotism, no self-control, no logic gives any man
enough strength to repel relentlessly pressed attacks
utilizing accumulated combinations of facts and
circumstantial evidence.8
The twentieth century witnessed a major transformation in the role
of intelligence that reconfirmed the central role of interrogation
operations. In a unique retrospective on intelligence, David Kahn, a
prodigious author on military intelligence, delineates intelligence into
two primary categories: physical intelligence (i.e., intelligence derived
from things) and verbal intelligence (i.e., intelligence derived from
words). He cites aerial photographs and the bodies of fallen soldiers as
examples of the former, while a report on enemy morale or a stolen
document outlining adversary mobilization plans are examples of the
latter.
Kahn asserts that in the course of the first 4,000 years of warfare,
physical intelligence provided the preponderance of intelligence for
political and military leaders. With the advent of World War I, however,
conditions evolved whereby the collection of verbal intelligence—
specifically including the interrogation of prisoners—became the
predominant mode. This fundamental paradigm shift in the nature of
intelligence collection was driven, in Kahn’s view, by a simple battlefield
practicality: “It gave enough commanders enough time in enough cases
to win perceptible numbers of victories.”9
As the last century unfolded, however, interrogation operations
navigated a rocky course. The increasing value placed on verbal
intelligence vaulted interrogation to a new level, resulting in the
development of vitally successful American, British, and German
strategic interrogation programs during World War II that were
supported—and valued—at the highest echelons of government. In
contrast, interrogation proved a far more modest success during the
century’s limited wars. In Vietnam and the first Gulf War, for example,
RAYMOND F. TOLIVER, THE INTERROGATOR: THE STORY OF HANNS JOACHIM SCHARFF:
MASTER INTERROGATOR OF THE LUFTWAFFE 119 (Aero Publishers 1978).
9
KAHN, supra note 5, at 39–41.
8
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interrogation became embroiled in controversy, specifically in the case of
the Vietnam War (despite many instances of success based on
enlightened cultural finesse) and was managed as largely an ad hoc
affair in the case of the first Gulf War.
There is no doubt that the role of British
intelligence . . . during the Battle of Britain was a decisive one
[and] there is equally little doubt that POW [prisoner-of-war]
intelligence made a significant contribution to that decision.10
III. INTERROGATION OR TORTURE: THE RAZOR’S EDGE
Although a ubiquitous topic of discussion, the term interrogation can
generate an array of emotionally charged images and continues to be a
source of significant misunderstanding for both the intelligence
professional and the layperson. Physical coercion—from the subtle to
the horrific—has all too often been portrayed in the media as a
seemingly integral part of, perhaps even synonymous with, the
interrogation process. Unfortunately, the history of the discipline is
filled with far too many instances where interrogation was simply a
guise for torture, and such heinous behavior still remains a tool of
intimidation under far too many political regimes.
In the debate over the employment of coercive measures, proponents
are quick to argue that the application of limited physical and/or
psychological pressures does not necessarily meet the generally accepted
definitions of torture. And in theory, they may be correct. The problem
lies in the fact that interrogations are conducted in the theater of stark
reality, not a virtual world of words. The problematic scenario—and the
challenges attendant to rendering a meaningful assessment of what
clearly defines torture—introduced by the application of coercive means
is eloquently captured by Mark Moyar in Phoenix and the Birds of Prey, a
well-researched account of Operation Phoenix conducted during the
Vietnam War:
Some people define torture as the infliction of severe
physical pain on a defenseless person. . . . I define
torture as the infliction of any pain on a defenseless
individual because deciding which activities inflict

Kevin Jones, From the Horse’s Mouth: Luftwaffe POWs As Sources for Air Ministry
Intelligence During the Battle of Britain, 15 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 61, 76
(EBSCO Publishing 2000) (quotation marks omitted).
10
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severe pain is an excessively complicated and imprecise
business.11
IV. THE PROCESS IS DEFINED BY THE OBJECTIVES
As noted previously, interrogation has been a multifaceted tool
employed by one power against another for centuries. Dr. Paul Fein, in
his dissertation We Have Ways . . . . The Law and Morality of the
Interrogation of Prisoners of War, provides an insightful perspective that
facilitates a better understanding of this phenomenon. In this unique
study, interrogation is divided into three general categories: (1)
interrogation to obtain military information; (2) interrogation in order to
convert; and (3) interrogation in order to break the will.12
Interrogation operations conducted by U.S. military forces and U.S.
intelligence officers have almost exclusively fallen within Fein’s first
category: interrogation to obtain military information.13 In the complex,
integrated modern battle space this would be properly expanded to also
encompass, at a minimum, the pursuit of political, economic, and
technical information.
The second category, interrogation in order to convert, operates from
a premise that the surrender or capture of enemy forces falls short of
achieving overarching political-military goals.14 As described by Fein,
“The prisoner of war was now expected to become one with, or at a
minimum to side with, the capturing power.”15 Political indoctrination
or reeducation plays a paramount role here and is accomplished through
psychological and physical pressures supplemented by hours of
compulsory rote memorization of political doctrine. Fein credits the
Chinese during the Korean War as the first nation to systematically
employ interrogation for political purposes and vice intelligence
gathering, describing the event as the “first war in history fought both for
ideological purposes and by ideological means.”16
Fein’s third category, interrogation in order to break the will, focuses
on a single objective: to compel the prisoner, through any means
necessary, to perform an action he would not otherwise accomplish
under his own volition.17 While intelligence may be obtained in the
MARK MOYAR, PHOENIX AND THE BIRDS OF PREY: THE CIA’S SECRET CAMPAIGN TO
DESTROY THE VIET CONG 90 (Naval Institute Press 1997) (emphasis in original).
12
See Fein, supra note 4, at 112–36.
13
Id. at 112.
14
Id. at 120.
15
Id. at 121.
16
Id. at 120 (emphasis in original).
17
See Fein, supra note 4, at 129.
11
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course of the interrogation, it is of secondary interest. Instead, the
common objective that drives this form of interrogation is the production
of propaganda. The often brutal treatment of captured U.S. military
personnel held by North Vietnam during the Vietnam War provides a
graphic example of interrogations of this nature.18
During World War II, the last conflict fought on a truly global scale,
interrogation was conducted by the intelligence services of all parties to
the conflict. There was, however, considerable disparity in the methods
employed and objectives served. While U.S. strategic interrogators,
along with their British military intelligence counterparts, employed
sophisticated techniques designed exclusively to gather critical
intelligence data, other organizations operated with a considerably
harsher and arguably inhumane agenda.
The Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei—Germany’s internal security
apparatus) provides one example of this malicious approach. It
routinely used interrogation not for the information gathering benefits
but as a cruel and highly effective means of mass intimidation consistent
with Fein’s third category of interrogation. In his book Piercing the Reich,
Joseph Persico provides a graphic characterization of the Gestapo’s
methods. The primary objective was intimidation in support of the
greater goal of mass subjugation:
Before an interrogation began, the suspect was routinely
roughed up for the shock value. The effect of this
arbitrary viciousness was to daze, humiliate, and throw
prisoners off balance at the outset in the contest of wills
with their inquisitors. . . . Once begun, the process was
nearly irreversible. If the prisoner had nothing to say
under mild torture, the screws were progressively
tightened. He might be dead or dying before his
tormentors could bring themselves to accept that he did
indeed know nothing.19
When intimidation, not intelligence, is the objective, the use of
coercive means in interrogation is unfortunately commonplace (and for
that very specific purpose it is demonstrably effective). In addition to
the Gestapo, Stalin’s secret police apparatus were widely feared for just
this reason.20 The criminal nature of such methods aside, the operational

Id. at 129–35.
JOSEPH E. PERSICO, PIERCING THE REICH: THE PENETRATION OF NAZI GERMANY BY
AMERICAN SECRET AGENTS DURING WORLD WAR II 81 (The Viking Press 1979).
20
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE PLIGHT OF THE PRISONER OF WAR 47 (1955).
18
19
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nuance that should not be lost here is this: any truthful information
obtained in the course of these interrogations was almost always corrupted by
fabricated data, false admissions or identifications, and unfounded speculation,
all introduced by the individual being interrogated in the vain hope of ending
the torment.
The world’s most sophisticated intelligence services quickly
understood this important distinction. Markus Wolf, the former head of
the vaunted East German foreign intelligence service, acknowledged this
fundamental principle when he observed that “interrogations . . . should
serve to extract useful information from the prisoner . . . not to exact
revenge by means of intimidation or torture.”21
V. THE PROMISE OF INTERROGATION
At its core, interrogation is an intensely focused interpersonal
dynamic. While concepts drawn from research in the behavioral
sciences have helped shape new and innovative methods, the actual
exploitation of a hostile source remains solidly based on the ability of
one individual to systematically influence the decision-making cycle of
another. In essence, interrogation remains the same managed exchange
of information it was when the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu offered his
timeless observations on the use of spies more than 2,500 years ago in his
classic treatise, The Art of War:
What enables the wise sovereign and the good general to
strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach
of ordinary men, is foreknowledge.
Now this
foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot
be obtained inductively from experience, nor by any
deductive calculation.
Knowledge of the enemy's
dispositions can only be obtained from other men.22
The passage above reflects a unique aspect of interrogation that sets
it apart from other means of intelligence collection: its ability to gather
intelligence through direct and ongoing contact with the enemy. It does
not involve the passive collection of signals or the remote sensing of
images. In the course of an interrogation, collectors and analysts are not
left to question what was meant by a phrase plucked from the ether by
signals intelligence (SIGINT) or the nature of the activities inside a
MARKUS WOLF & ANNE MCELVOY, MAN WITHOUT A FACE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
COMMUNISM’S GREATEST SPYMASTER 261–62 (Crown 1997).
22
SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 77–78 (James Clavell ed., Delacorte Press 1983) (emphasis
in original).
21
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structure viewed through the lens of imagery intelligence (IMINT).
These questions, and those that logically flow from the responses, can be
addressed directly by a source—the enemy prisoner or detainee—who
can, under the right circumstances, provide immediate answers.
Thus, the primary objective of an interrogation is the collection of
actionable intelligence. This is reflected in modern U.S. doctrine that
defines interrogation as:
[T]he art of questioning and examining a source to
obtain the maximum amount of useable information.
The goal of any interrogation is to obtain useable and
reliable information, in a lawful manner and in the least
amount of time, which meets intelligence requirements
of any echelon of command. . . . Each interrogation has a
definite purpose—to obtain information to satisfy the
assigned requirement which contributes to the
successful accomplishment of the supported unit's
mission.23
VI. THE EVOLUTION OF INTERROGATION
In assessing both the promise of interrogation and the problem of
torture, there are a number of useful insights that can be drawn from a
look at how the craft has evolved over time. Toward that end, a review
of the strategies and objectives involved suggest a sluggish evolution
marked by two generations separated by a transformation in
perspective.
Through most of recorded history, prevailing political powers
employed “first generation” strategies that relied heavily on the
employment of physical force. In this era, the fundamental objective of
terrorizing—and thereby controlling—target populations took
precedence over the collection of information. It is of vital importance to
note that many of the methods and even some of the devices employed
today emerged during what might accurately be labeled the dark ages of
interrogation. The waterboard, prolonged standing, forced nudity, sleep
deprivation, and exposure to extremes in temperature were all the
products of those seeking to terrorize rather than to obtain truthful
information. The fundamental outcome of brutal, first generation
methods was to force an individual to recant a politically unpopular
pronouncement or to cause an innocent individual to admit to fabricated
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 34-52: INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION 1-0
(1987).

23
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charges of wrongdoing. In sum, this form of interrogation had
everything to do with state security but absolutely nothing to do with
intelligence.
The “second generation” of interrogation began to appear over a
number of decades during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. It did not begin to receive formal institutional recognition,
however, until the closing years of World War I, when the British
Director of Military Intelligence began to examine in earnest the need to
obtain timely and reliable information from prisoners of war. From that
beginning, the strategic interrogation programs that would later be
developed by the German, British, and American militaries during
World War II established, in unprecedented fashion, the potential
treasure trove of information that can be obtained from the systematic,
outcome-oriented approach to interrogation that relied far more on
finesse than on force.
VII. THE PROBLEM OF TORTURE
As the impetus for following up on this promising beginning began
to fade shortly after the conclusion of World War II, the experience of
Americans held prisoner during the Cold War (especially during the
Korean and Vietnam conflicts) and the Soviet show trials gave rise to a
new emphasis on designing strategies for resisting coercive methods of
interrogation.
As a result, the preponderance of United States
Government sanctioned research relating to interrogation focused on
deconstructing coercive methods with the objective of developing
strategies that would protect American servicemen who faced the
possibility of being held in foreign governmental detention and
subjected to prolonged exploitation. It was during the course of these
studies that such concepts as stress positions, sensory deprivation, and
dietary manipulation entered into the lexicon of the U.S. Intelligence
Community, but then only as an understanding of the threat posed by
regimes that flagrantly ignored the rights of prisoners as set forth under
the Geneva Conventions.
During this same period, however, the study of non-coercive
interrogation methods to support intelligence collection received only
modest interest. Interrogation tactics, techniques, and procedures
established in the Cold War era fell short in building upon the legacy of
World War II strategic interrogation operations.
Instead, the
contemporary interrogation doctrine and training curricula have been
developed without the benefit of formal studies into the efficacy of
current offensive interrogation methods. In sum, a considerable portion
of “what we know” about interrogation—including the numerous
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approaches described in the Army Field Manual on interrogation,
detecting of deception, and drawing objective meaning from observing
nonverbal communication—has never been subjected to scientific
scrutiny. There is, in fact, considerable research literature to suggest that
many of the current methods are either ineffective or
counterproductive.24
When the post-9/11 environment brought about a renewed interest
in interrogation methods, existing methodologies and traditional
standards of conduct were adulterated by principles of coercive
interrogation drawn from the studies of Communist methodologies. It
must be repeatedly emphasized that these methodologies focused on
compelling a prisoner to generate propaganda—false confessions, for
example—for political purposes rather than accurate information to meet
intelligence requirements. As the wars of the new century continued, the
employment of coercive methods by American interrogators appeared
with alarming frequency.
When interrogators—many of whom are very young, possess a
limited education, and work with only a superficial familiarity of
cultural realities—are pressed into service with training based on
outmoded concepts that are largely at odds with the current behavioral
science literature, the potential benefits of interrogation will never be
realized. Additionally, when these same young men and women are
deployed around the world without the benefit of a comprehensive
understanding of the art and science of interrogation and without the
guiding hand of an inviolate standard of conduct and ethics, the problem
of torture is unlikely to be resolved.
VIII. THE WAY AHEAD
To borrow a catchphrase once learned from an Army Ranger, the
only things standing between this nation and a transformation in its
approach to interrogation and the treatment of detainees are air and
opportunity. Both the promise and the problem can be ably addressed
through a transition to a “third generation” of interrogation, where
strategies underlying the foundation of this new paradigm will be
informed by the following considerations:
• Methods will be consistent with long-standing U.S. legal and
moral traditions.

24
The author of this Article has worked extensively with behavioral science researchers
from academic and research institutions across the nation in the examination of current
interrogation doctrine. Works to be published in the coming year will provide a detailed
analysis that supports this assertion.
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Formal research will, whenever possible, seek to demonstrate
the efficacy of methods in an operational setting.
There will be an institutional recognition of interrogation’s
complex challenges as on par with those of clandestine collection
operations.
Standards of conduct and formal vetting programs will be
introduced to limit recruitment to those individuals best suited
for dealing with the complexities and ambiguities of
interrogation.
The long-term examination of selected high-value sources will
take place under exacting standards and subject to appropriate
oversight.
Rigorous requirements for initial and ongoing training
accompanied by an unambiguous standard of ethics and
practices will introduce a new level of professionalism into the
interrogation discipline.

The challenges before the new Administration—and indeed before
the country—while formidable, are not insurmountable. That these
challenges still remain before us is reflective not necessarily of their
complexity, but rather of the prior absence of a systematic effort to
address them. In this regard, the words of Colin Powell, former
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of State, hold true:
“There are no secrets to success. It is the result of preparation, hard
work, and learning from failure.”25

OREN HARARI, THE LEADERSHIP SECRETS OF COLIN POWELL 164 (McGraw-Hill
Professional 2003).

25
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